Getting on that slipperiest of slippery slopes: Caleb Cain examines the case against democracy in a piece for The New Yorker. Crain says “democracy is other people, and the ignorance of the many has long galled the few, especially the few who consider themselves intellectuals” and worry about voters’ ignorance and their impact on governance. What’s good about democracy? Crain, citing Amartya Sen, notes that the case has been made that “democracies never have famines … they almost never go to war with one another, rarely murder their own populations, nearly always have peaceful transitions of government, and respect human rights more consistently than other regimes do.”
What if there’s an alternative to democracy? The origins of the arguments against a fully democratic system can be traced back to some of Plato’s writings and more recent notions by John Stuart Mill. Cain posits the question: “So, if we value its power to make good decisions, why not try a system that’s a little less fair but makes good decisions even more often?”
David Estlund, a political philosopher at Brown, posited the idea coined “epistocracy,” a term that jams together the Greek work for “knowledge” and the one for “rule.” Crain quotes Estlund, who resisted the idea, in saying “it’s an idea that ‘advocates of democracy, and other enemies of despotism, will want to resist.’” Philosophically, Estlund only saw three valid objections to the idea: “First, one could deny that truth was a suitable standard for measuring political judgment… Estlund wasn’t a relativist, however; he agreed that politicians should refrain from appealing to absolute truth, but he didn’t think a political theorist could avoid doing so… The second argument against epistocracy would be to deny that some citizens know more about good government than others… The third and final option: deny that knowing more imparts political authority. As Estlund put it, ‘You might be right, but who made you boss?’”
By the end of Estlund’s analysis, Crain says there are only two practical arguments left standing against epistocracy. “The first was the possibility that an epistocracy’s method of screening voters might be biased in a way that couldn’t readily be identified and therefore couldn’t be corrected for. The second was that universal suffrage is so established in our minds as a default that giving the knowledgeable power over the ignorant will always feel more unjust than giving those in the majority power over those in the minority.” Contrasting that view, Georgetown political philosopher Jason Brennan “argues that it’s entirely justifiable to limit the political power that the irrational, the ignorant, and the incompetent have over others. To counter Estlund’s concern for fairness, Brennan asserts that the public’s welfare is more important than anyone’s hurt feelings; after all, he writes, few would consider it unfair to disqualify jurors who are morally or cognitively incompetent. As for Estlund’s worry about demographic bias, Brennan waves it off. Empirical research shows that people rarely vote for their narrow self-interest.” Crain notes that Brennan is reluctant to say how an epistocracy would function in real life.