Nigeria’s own story of its disastrously delayed devaluation is a cautionary tale that has perhaps come too late to do us any good: Egypt is far from the only country in the world experiencing an FX crisis; many oil exporters have witnessed their reserves evaporate as they attempt to defend their managed currencies as global oil prices have remained depressed for years. Nigeria’s case in particular sounds awfully familiar to what we’re experiencing here at home, if one were simply to substitute “tourism receipts” for “oil revenue” and “EGP” for “naira.” Of course there are major differences — Egypt’s economy is far more diversified and is not as reliant on tourism as Nigeria is on oil. But with regard to sources of FX, this comparison sounds hauntingly familiar. The causes of the crises are different, the structure of the economies are wildly different, but the policy response and outcomes are too similar to ignore: “Scarcity of foreign exchange. A widening gap between the official rate and the runaway black market.”

Despite Nigeria having already floated the naira back in June, the delay in taking this step has further crippled Nigeria’s private sector, exacerbating the country’s now-confirmed recession. The Financial Times’ Maggie Fick (an old Egypt hand) wrote in August of Nigeria: “Critics accuse the government of aggravating the country’s problems with accusations that it reacted too slowly to the crisis and that it has pursued policies that have deepened the turmoil. The central bank’s decisions to restrict access to [USD] for certain imports and not allow a flexible exchange rate for the naira have been blamed for stymieing businesses and investment, while pushing up prices of everything from fuel to rice and soap.”

Some may raise an objection here, pointing to Egypt’s current pursuit of an IMF loan to help cushion the expected devaluation, as opposed to Nigeria, which as recently as last April, has said it refuses to pursue financing from the IMF because, according to its finance minister: “Nigeria is not sick and even if we are, we have our own local remedy.” But is this really any different from Egypt reaching a staff level agreement with the IMF in 2011 to then turn around in the same year and say it was not needed? And then reach another staff level agreement in 2012, postpone it over political machinations and the avoidance of reform in the same year,then in July and October of 2013 once again say the IMF loan was not needed at all in light of plentiful GCC aid?

Of course the country’s economic circumstances were better throughout almost all of that period, but the structural weaknesses were the same. And those circumstances have only deteriorated as the country burned through its reserves to avoid taking the decisions which it now has no choice but to take, but now finding itself in a much more precarious situation.

ReadNigeria’s case study on how not to float your currencyor for a broader view, see the Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder: Currency crises in emerging markets.